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ABSTRACT:
If discretionary monetary policy implies an inflation bias, monetary unification boosts the
accumulation of public debt. The additional debt accumulation is welfare reducing only if
governments are sufficiently myopic. In the presence of myopic governments, debt ceilings play a
useful role in avoiding excessive debt accumulation in a monetary union and allow a conservative,
independent central bank to focus on price stability.
Keywords: Common central bank, monetary union, credibility effect, government
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1. Introduction
Many central bankers fear that establishing a European Monetary Union (EMU) will result
in excessive accumulation of public debt. In response to this fear, which was voiced in the Report
of the so-called Delors Committee (1989), the Maastricht treaty incorporates fiscal entrance criteria
for EMU, including ceilings on public debt and fiscal deficits. Moreover, to discipline fiscal
policymakers, it proposes strict surveillance of national fiscal policies within the EMU. These
restrictions aimed at disciplining fiscal policy have been criticized for being both unnecessary and
undesirable (see, e.g., Buiter and Kletzer, 1991, and Bean, 1992).
This paper explores whether monetary unification results in the excessive accumulation of
public debt. To that end, we formulate a dynamic two-period model of discretionary monetary and
fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993) and Debelle
and Fischer (1994) explore the interaction between discretionary monetary and fiscal policy in a
static setting of a closed economy. Obstfeld (1991a,b) and Jensen (1994) study the dynamics of
public debt under monetary discretion. Employing a model in the tradition of Barro and Gordon
(1983) to incorporate commitment problems, we extend these dynamic models of discretionary
policymaking to a monetary union with several fiscal policymakers. Within such a framework,
decentralized, national fiscal policies impact the other fiscal players by affecting the inflation rate
set by the common central bank (CCB), which is unable to commit.
Our paper differs in a number of ways from other papers that study the dynamic
interactions between fiscal and monetary policies in a monetary union (see, e.g., Levine and
Pearlman, 1992; Levine, 1993; Levine and Brociner, 1994; Krichel, Levine and Pearlman, 1994).
First, our model allows for analytical solutions, which provide additional intuition about the effects
of the policy interactions on public debt accumulation and welfare. Second, we analyze how
political distortions affect public debt policy. Third, we explore optimal institutions (such as debt
ceilings and an independent, conservative CCB) designed to address commitment problems and
political distortions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explores how monetary unification affects debt accumulation. If discretionary policymaking gives
rise to an inflation bias, we confirm the prediction of central bankers that monetary unification
relaxes fiscal discipline by boosting the accumulation of public debt. Turning to normative issues,
Section 4 investigates whether the additional debt accumulation can be termed excessive in the
sense that it harms welfare. Contrary to the fear of the central bankers, the additional accumulation
of public debt turns out to be welfare enhancing if governments represent the preferences of their
societies. However, if fiscal policymakers are myopic in the sense that they are more impatient
than society, the additional debt accumulation may harm welfare by excacerbating the political
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distortions associated with myopia. Section 5 explores the optimal design of monetary and fiscal
institutions in the presence of discretionary policymaking. In line with Rogoff (1985), the central
bank should be made more conservative (in the sense that it attaches a higher priority to price
stability) than society to offset the monetary distortions due to the lack of commitment. In the
absence of political distortions, an optimally designed conservative, independent central bank can
reach the second best (i.e. the Pareto optimum in the absence of lump-sum taxes). In the presence
of myopic governments, however, a conservative central bank needs to be supplemented by debt
ceilings to estabish the second best. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model
2.1. Output and social objectives
The monetary union consists of n participating countries. Whereas the common central
bank (CCB) sets monetary policy for the entire union, fiscal policy is determined at a
decentralized, national level by the n governments. All economies are identical and each economy
produces a single perfectly substitutable good. Without barriers to commodity trade, the inflation
rate is uniform across the union. Labor is immobile internationally.1
Consider some economy i (i=1,..,n). Following, among others, Alesina and Tabellini
(1987), Debelle (1993) and Debelle and Fischer (1994), workers are represented by trade unions
whose sole objective is to achieve a target real wage rate, the logarithm of which we normalize to
zero. Therefore, the (log) of the nominal wage rate in period t is set equal to the (rationally)
expected (log) price level in period t, pt
e, where the superscript "e" denotes an expectation.
Nominal wage contracts are signed before discretionary policies are selected. Accordingly, unions
act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the authorities.
Output of a representative firm in country i amounts to Yit = Lit
η (0<η<1), where Lit is
labor. The firm’s output is taxed at a rateτit. The firm maximizes profits, PtLitη(1-τit)-WtLit, where
Pt and Wt denote, respectively, the price level and the wage rate, which are uniform across the
union. Hence, (log) output is given by yit = (η/(1-η))(πt-πte-τit+logη), where πt stands for the
inflation rate, which is defined as log(Pt/ t-1). For convenience, we normalize output by subtracting
the constant (η/(1-η))logη from yit. Hence, normalized output, xit, amounts to
1 For the case of Europe it is well known that labor is relatively immobile (for example, due to
linguistic, cultural, social and institutional barriers).
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xit = ν(πt-πte-τit), ν≡η/(1-η). (2.1)
Without tax distortions (i.e.τit=0), xit=0 in a rational expectations equilibrium (where
inflation is anticipated, i.e.πt=πte, see (2.1)). In addition to distortionary output taxes, we allow for
other, non-tax, distortions due to, for example, union power in the labor market or monopoly
power in commodity markets. The first-best output level, i.e. output with neither tax nor non-tax
distortions, is denoted by ˜xt. Thus, x̃t>0 measures the non-tax distortions and can be interpreted as
an implicit tax on output. In fact, by offsetting the implicit output tax, an output subsidy (τit=-x̃t/ν)
can raise output towards its first-best level ˜xt.
Each society features a social welfare function. By accounting for the preferences of both
workers and non-workers, social objectives differ from the objectives of the unions. In particular,
the loss function of society i is defined over inflation, output and public spending:
VS,i = ½ ∑t2=1 βSt-1 [απS πt2 + (xit-x̃t)2 + αgS (git-g̃t)2], 0<βS≤1, απS,αgS>0. (2.2)
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of inflation, (log) output and government spending (git s
government spending as a share of non-distortionary output) from their targets (or first-best levels
or ’bliss points’).2 Social objectives are the same in each country. The target level of inflation
corresponds to price stability. The non-distortionary output level, ˜xt, represents the bliss point for
output. The first-best level of government spending, ˜gt, can be interpreted as the optimal share of
non-distortionary output to be spent on public goods if (non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes are
available (see Debelle and Fischer, 1994). ParametersαπS and αgS correspond to the weights of the
price stability and government spending objectives, respectively, relative to the weight of the
output objective. The limiting case ofαgS→∞ corresponds to the situation where government
spending is exogenously fixed at ˜gt. Finally, βS denotes society’s subjective discount factor.
2.2. The fiscal authorities
Country i’s government features the following loss function:
VF,i = ½ ∑t2=1 βFt-1 [απS πt2 + (xit-x̃t)2 + αgS (git-g̃t)2], 0<βF≤1. (2.3)
2 Employment is directly related to output through the production function. Hence, instead of output,
employment could have been included as an argument in the loss functions, with the target employment level
corresponding to the output level in absence of any distortions.
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The subjective discount factor of the fiscal authorities,βF may differ from societies’,βS. A
government whose subjective rate of time preference exceeds that of society (i.e.βF<βS) will be
calledmyopic. Such myopia may originate in a high probability of being voted out of office at the
end of period one.3
The government of country i faces the following government budget constraint (see, e.g.,
Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995):
git + (1+ρ)di,t-1 = τit + κπt + dit, t=1,2, (2.4)
whereρ respresents the (constant) real rate of return required by a risk-neutral investor who faces
an outside investment opportunity with the same real rate of return.τit and κ≥0 (a constant) stand
for, respectively, distortionary tax revenue and real holdings of base money as shares of non-
distortionary output. Modern economies feature low holdings of base money due to the presence of
efficient financial systems. Accordingly, we assume thatκ<1.4 All countries share equally in the
seigniorage revenues of the CCB. Accordingly, the seigniorage revenues accruing to country i are
given byκπt. Furthermore, di,t-1 is the amount of public debt carried over from the previous period,
while dit is the amount of newly issued public debt. All public debt is real and matures after one
period.
Countries feature the same initial stock of public debt, d0. With all debt being paid off at
the end of the second period (di2=0, i=1,..,n), the government budget constraints in the two periods
can be consolidated into a single intertemporal government budget constraint,
(1+ρ)d0 + gi1 + gi2/(1+ρ) = τi1+κπ1 + (τi2+κπ2)/(1+ρ). (2.5)
For later convenience, we derive thegovernment financing requirementby rewriting (2.4)
as,
GFRit ≡ K̃t + (1+ρ)di,t-1 - dit = [τit+x̃t/ν] + κπt + [g̃t-git], whereK̃t≡g̃t+x̃t/ν. (2.6)
3 Accordingly, short election cycles and political instability may make governments rather myopic, which
raises the effective rate at which they discount future events. For theoretical and empirical work on the
interactions between short election cycles or political instability and public debt accumulation, see for
example Roubini and Sachs (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990).
4 Tabellini (1986), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993) and Debelle and Fischer (1994), in
contrast, assume thatκ=1. However, as will become clear below, the fact thatκ is smaller than unity plays
an important role for our results.
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The government financing requirement (GFRit) amounts to the government spending target ˜t, a
labor subsidy aimed at offsetting the implicit output tax due to non-tax distortions, ˜xt/ν, and net
debt servicing costs, (1+ρ)di,t-1-dit. The last right-hand side of (2.6) represents the sources of
finance: explicit and implicit tax revenues,τit+x̃t/ν, seigniorage revenues,κπt and the shortfall of
government spending from its target, ˜gt-git.
If we take the discounted (to period 1) sums of the left and right hand sides of ((2.6),
t=1,2), we obtain theintertemporal government financing requirement,
F̃ ≡ (1+ρ)d0 + K̃1 + K̃2/(1+ρ) = ∑t2=1 (1+ρ)-(t-1) [(τit+x̃t/ν)+κπt+(g̃t-git)]. (2.7)
2.3. The common central bank
Monetary policy is selected by the common central bank (CCB). Its objective function
amounts to
VM = ½ ∑t2=1 βSt-1 { απM πt2 + ∑in=1 [(xit-x̃t)2 + αgM (git-g̃t)2]/n}, απM, αgM>0. (2.8)
We allow the CCB’s price stability weight,απM, to diverge from societies’,απS. If απM=απS and
αgM=αgS,5 the objective function of the CCB corresponds to an equally weighted average of the
individual societies’ objective functions.
In each period, the CCB and the government are involved in a Nash game. Each
government selects taxes, public spending and (in period one) public debt, taking as given the
inflation rate and expectations about the inflation rate in the current period.6 At the same time, the
common monetary policy is set by the CCB, which is unable to commit and takes as given the
governments’ policy choices as well as the current period inflation expectations.
























τ it x̃t/ν .
5 As will become clear below, the CCB’s spending weight does not affect the equilibrium.
6 Whereas the first-period fiscal authorities take inflation expectations in the first period as given, they
can affect second-period inflation expectations by using public debt. In this way, the first-period fiscal
authorities act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the various players in the second period.
7 A complete derivation of the equilibrium is contained in Appendix A.
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Higher expected inflation and more severe tax and non-tax distortions in any of the participating
countries reduce output below its target level, thereby inducing the CCB to use unanticipated
inflation as an instrument to expand output. The weight the CCB attaches to output in country i is
only 1/n-th of the weight that a national central bank would attach to output if monetary policy
would be set at the national rather than the union level. Therefore, the inflation-reducing effect of a
unilateral cut in the tax rateτi is only 1/n-th of the corresponding effect under national monetary
policymaking. Intuitively, in a monetary union with many fiscal players, the strategic position of
each individual fiscal player vis-à-vis the (common) monetary authority is relatively weak.
3. Does monetary unification boost debt accumulation?
Central bankers often express the fear that European monetary unification will result in
excessive accumulation of public debt. Before the next section considers the welfare implications
of debt accumulation, this section explores the positive question whether the establishment of a
monetary union can be expected to boost the accumulation of debt.
In determining debt policy (see Appendix A.1), the first-period fiscal authorities equate the
marginal benefit from issuing more debt (i.e. smaller distortionary losses in the first period) to the
marginal cost (i.e. larger distortionary losses in the second period on account of higher debt
service):8
ND
-1[K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-d1] = βF(1+ρ)(NDU*/ND2)[K̃2+(1+ρ)d1], (3.1)
where ND≡κ/απM+1/ν2+1/αgS>0 and NDU*≡(1/n)(απS/απM2)+((n-1)/n)(κ/απM)+1/ν2+1/αgS>0. We
can solve explicitly for first-period debt from the first-order condition (3.1):
[βFU*(1+ρ)+1] d1 = [K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-K̃2] + (1-βFU*)K̃2, (3.2)
where βFU*≡βF(1+ρ)(NDU*/ND)=βF(1+ρ)[1+(1/n)απM-1(απS/απM-κ)/ND]. This section assumes that
the monetary authorities share society’s price stability weight (i.e.απM=απS), so that
βFU*=βF(1+ρ)[1+(1/n)απS-1(1-κ)/ND]. Without commitment problems,βFU*=βF(1+ρ). The term
(1/n)απS-1(1-κ)/ND>0, which thus originates in the inability to commit, raises the effective discount
factor βFU*, thereby raising the marginal costs of debt accumulation (see the right-hand side of
(3.1)) and thus reducing first-period debt (i.e.∂d1/∂βFU*<0, see (3.2)). This term will be called the
8 We omit the country index because the identical economies set the same fiscal policy.
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credibility effectbecause it stems from the attempts of the first-period fiscal player to enhance the
credibility of anti-inflation policies in the second period. In particular, whereas they perceive
inflation expectations in the first period to be given, first-period fiscal policymakers can use debt
policy to affect inflation expectations in the second period. From the ex-ante perspective of these
policymakers, second-period inflation expectations are too high due to the inability of the CCB to
commit.9 Accordingly, first-period fiscal policymakers reduce debt accumulation in order to reduce
the "stock of credibility problems" in the second period, as measured by the government financing
requirementK̃2+(1+ρ)d1. In this way, the lower stock of debt alleviates the inflationary bias
because the lower second-period financing requirement allows for lower second-period tax rates,
thereby decreasing the incentive facing the CCB to employ unanticipated inflation as an instrument
to alleviate tax distortions (see the reaction function of the CCB (2.9)).10
If the monetary union becomes larger (i.e. n grows), the credibility effect becomes less
effective in raising the effective discount rateβFU*, thereby boosting debt accumulation. In fact, if
n→∞, the credibility effect vanishes completely. Intuitively, from the perspective of each individual
government, the credibility of the CCB is a public good. In a larger union, each individual fiscal
authority faces less of an incentive to contribute to this public good by building up assets, because
the (perceived) beneficial effects of more assets (and thus lower second-period taxes) in terms of
lower second-period inflation are smaller (see (2.9)). Hence, public debt and thus long-term
inflation are higher in a monetary union (i.e. n>1) than with national monetary policymaking (i.e.
n=1).
4. Does monetary unification yield excessive debt accumulation?
Section 3 confirms that monetary unification results in additional accumulation of public
debt if discretionary policymaking implies an inflation bias. To scrutinize the presumption of
central bankers that the EMU would result inexcessivedebt accumulation, this section turns to the
welfare implications of the additional debt accumulation in a monetary union.
To that end, we write society’s equilibrium welfare loss VS
U in a monetary union as
follows (see Appendix A.2):
9 Discretionary monetary policymaking suffers from an inflation bias because the price stability weight of
the CCB coincides with that of society. If the CCB’s price stability weight would exceed society’s weight,
inflation is no longer necessarily excessive. In particular, ifαπM=απS/κ, inflation is optimal and the
credibility effect vanishes (asβFU*=βF(1+ρ); see Section 5).
10 In Obstfeld (1991a,b), the government accumulates assets in order to alleviate the time-inconsistency




































(1 ρ)2 (β FU)2 β S
β FU(1 ρ) 1
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.
The factor LA is termed theintratemporal welfare lossbecause it corresponds to the intratemporal
distribution of distortions across the available instruments. The factor LE stems from the
intertemporal distribution of distortionary losses across the two periods and, therefore, will be
called theintertemporal welfare loss.
The intertemporal welfare loss indicates whether debt accumulation is excessive. In
particular, this component LE is strictly decreasing inβFU* if βFU*<βS*≡βS(1+ρ), strictly increasing
in βFU* if βFU*>βS*, and thus attains its global minimum atβFU*=βS*. Accordingly, debt policy
implies the optimal intertemporal allocation of distortionary losses if and only ifβFU*=βS* while
debt accumulation is excessive if and only ifβFU*<βS*. This latter inequality can be rewritten as:
(1/n)απM-1(απS/απM-κ)/ND < βS/βF - 1. (4.2)
4.1. Authorities share the social objectives
Compared to the second best (i.e. the Pareto optimum in the absence of lump-sum taxes,
which is attained if a benevolent, centralized policymaker can commit; see Appendix B), both the
intra- and intertemporal welfare loss components are too high. The additional intratemporal losses
originate in excessive inflation due to the self-defeating incentive facing discretionary monetary
policymakers to boost employment through inflation surprises.11
Intertemporal losses are excessive because the effective discount factor is too high from a
social point of view (i.e. βFU*=βS(1+ρ)[1+(1/n)απS-1(1-κ)/ND]>βS*). Intuitively, from the
perspective of the discretionary fiscal policymakers who set debt policy in the first period, only
second-period inflation expectations are endogenous. This induces these policymaker to rely
heavily on first-period financing, among other things in the form of unanticipated inflation. In
equilibrium, however, inflation expectations are endogenous also in the first period as the private
11 The independent central bank does not internalize government budget constraint (formally, it does not
optimize under the restriction imposed by the government budget constraint) and thus ignores the benefits of
inflation in terms of seigniorage revenue. However, with small holdings of base money (i.e.κ<1), this
distortion is dominated by the inflation bias associated with the lack of commitment.
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sector correctly anticipates the incentives of the first-period fiscal player to build up assets through
unanticipated inflation in the first period. Consequently, the discretionary equilibrium relies
excessively on first-period sources of financing and thus suffers from an asset bias (see also (4.2)
with απM=απS andβF=βS).
Monetary unification (i.e. an increase in the number of participating countries n) reduces
the asset bias by pushing debt accumulation in the direction of its second-best level.12 Accordingly,
a larger union raises welfare (n does not affect LA but reduces LE).
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4.2. Myopic governments (βF<βS)
With myopic governments, debt rather than asset accumulation may be excessive.14
Inequality (4.2) reveals that both the size of the union, n, and the political distortion (as measured
by βS/βF) determine whether the stock of public debt is too large from a social point of view. In
particular, for a large enough union or a small enough discount factorβF, inequality (4.2) holds so
that debt accumulation is excessive. In that case, a larger union implies more debt accumulation,
thereby exacerbating the debt bias in the initial equilibrium. Accordingly, the additional debt
accumulation in a larger monetary union can be termed ’excessive’.15,16
12 In fact, the second-best level of LE is approached as the number of countries goes to infinity (i.e.
n→∞).
13 Hence, if the authorities share the social objectives, the optimal size of the union is infinite.
14 Roubini and Sachs (1989) provide empirical evidence for the OECD countries that debt accumulation
is larger if the expected government tenure is shorter, so that the government effectively becomes more
myopic. In particular, if the expected tenure of the government is short, coalition governments find it hard to
cooperate in implementing budget cuts. Budget adjustments are therefore more likely to be postponed, which
results in more debt accumulation.
15 Hence, in the presence of myopic governments, the optimal size of the union is finite.
16 Fiscal cooperation induces governments to internalize the benefits that other governments perceive
from restraining debt accumulation in terms of building up the credibility of the CCB. Accordingly, fiscal
cooperation in a monetary union produces the same equilibrium as with national monetary policymaking (i.e.
n=1). In the absence of myopic governments, fiscal cooperation is counterproductive by exacerbating the
asset bias of the discretionary equilibrium. Whereas cooperation among benevolent fiscal players is thus
counterproductive, cooperation among myopic governments may raise welfare. The paradoxical nature of this
result is due to the interaction of various distortions in a third-best world.
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5. Optimal institutions
5.1. Optimal monetary arrangements in absence of political distortions
Rogoff (1985) has shown that, in the absence of commitment, society can make itself
better off by delegating discretionary monetary policy to an independent central bank who is more
conservative (i.e. attaches a higher weight to price stability) than society. Intuitively, by adjusting
monetary preferences, society offsets the distortions due to the lack of commitment. Indeed, in an
already distorted world, introducing another distortion may raise welfare.
If the preferences of the fiscal policymakers coincide with societies’, the price stability
weight of the CCB that minimizes the intratemporal welfare loss component in our model is given
by:17
απM = απMopt = απS/κ > απS. (5.1)
This confirms Rogoff’s (1985) finding that a conservative, independent central bank can help to
deal with commitment problems. An optimally designed independent central bank featuring the
price stability weight given by (5.1) minimizes not only intratemporal losses LA but also
intertemporal losses LE.
18 Accordingly, in the absence of fiscal imperfections, optimal monetary
arrangements produce the second best by alleviating both intra- intertemporal distortions.19
Intuitively, the incentive facing the fiscal authorities in the first period to accumulate assets in
order to enhance the credibility of second-period monetary policy originates in the inflation bias in
the second period. Endowing the CCB with the price stability weight in (5.1) eliminates this
inflation bias so that the fiscal authorities no longer perceive any need to employ debt policy to
alleviate the inflation bias.
17 This can be checked by differentiating LA with respect toαπM and noting that the derivative is
negative forαπM<απS/κ and positive forαπM>απS/κ.
18 By inserting (5.1) into the definition of the effective discount factor in order to eliminateαπM, we
find that the effective discount factorβFU* equalsβS*. This is the value ofβFU* that minimizes intertemporal
losses (see Section 4).
19 This statement holds irrespective of the size of a monetary union. Hence, monetary unification affects
neither the policy outcomes nor welfare in the presence of benevolent fiscal authorities and optimal monetary
institutions.
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5.2. Optimal monetary arrangements in the presence of political distortions
Optimal institutional design is complicated in the presence of myopic governments. In this
case, the second best can no longer be established by endowing an independent central bank with
the proper price stability weight. Furthermore, monetary institutions can no longer be targetted only
at the optimal intratemporal inflation rate but also must bear the burden of dealing with the
political distortions due to myopic governments. In particular, in the presence of myopic
governments (i.e.βF<βS), the central bank should be madelessconservative than in the absence of
fiscal imperfections (see Appendix C). The resulting inflation bias induces the fiscal authorities to
enhance the credibility of second period monetary policy by restraining debt accumulation, thereby
alleviating the excessive debt accumulation associated with myopia. The optimal price stability
weight of the CCB balances, on the one hand, the intratemporal distortion due to excessive
inflation originating in the lack of commitment (the ’monetary’ distortion) and, on the other hand,
the intertemporal distortion due to excessive debt accumulation originating in myopic governments
(the ’fiscal’ distortion). Raising the price stability weight from its optimal value towards the
optimal value in the absence of fiscal distortions (given by (5.1)), while reducing monetary
distortions, would worsen fiscal distortions due to myopic fiscal policymakers. This is a typical
second-best result: Removing a single distortion (the monetary distortion in this case) in a world
with multiple distortions may reduce overall welfare by exacerbating other distortions (the fiscal
distortion in this case).
5.3. Optimal monetary and fiscal arrangements in the presence political distortions
The previous sub-section showed that granting an independent central bank the proper
degree of conservatism is no longer sufficient for attaining the second best if governments are
myopic. Intuitively, monetary institutions are not the most appropriate instruments to address fiscal
imperfections. Indeed, in the presence of political distortions involving the preferences of the fiscal
authorities in addition to distortions due to the inability to commit monetary policy, the second
best can be established only by adopting two instruments, each targetted at a single distortion. In
this sub-section we explore debt targets as an instrument to address government myopia.
In the presence of a union-wide targetd̂1 on first-period public debt d1, each fiscal
authority solves two single period optimisation problems with exogenous government financing
requirementsK̃1+(1+ρ)d0-d̂1 and K̃2+(1+ρ)d̂1 in the first and second period, respectively. Optimal
intratemporal choices of inflation, taxes and public spending yield the following expression for
12
society’s welfare loss (see Appendix D):
(5.2)
LA K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 d̂1
2
β S K̃2 (1 ρ)d̂1
2
.




K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 K̃2 (1 β S)K̃2
β S(1 ρ) 1
, whereβ S≡β S(1 ρ).
The optimal debt target̂d1
opt, which coincides with debt accumulation in the second best, depends
on neither the size of the union nor the severity of political distortions. In fact, irrespective of the
degree of government myopia and the size of union, the second best is established by
supplementing an optimally designed conservative, independent CCB featuring a price stability
weight given by (5.1) with the optimal debt target given by (5.3). Indeed, the need to address not
only monetary distortions due to the lack of commitment but also fiscal distortions due to
government myopia explains why, following the Report of the Delors Committee (1989), the
Maastricht Treaty on the EMU incorporates ceilings on public debt as complements to a
conservative, independent European central bank. In this way, institutional arrangements are
targetted directly at the origins of the distortions so that monetary institutions can be designed
exclusively with an eye on price stability.
Debt targets are particularly useful in a monetary union with many myopic fiscal players
because unrestrained debt accumulation is likely to be most excessive in large monetary unions. In
particular, if βF is sufficiently low, the gap between unrestrained debt accumulation andd̂1opt
increases in the size of the union, n (see also (4.2)). The model thus explains not only why
European central bankers are such strong advocates of debt ceilings, but also why they are more
concerned about excessive debt accumulation in an EMU than with national monetary
policymaking.
6. Conclusions
This paper explored how monetary unification impacts the accumulation of public debt.
From a positive perspective, we showed that monetary unification boosts debt accumulation and
long-run inflation if discretionary monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias. Debt
accumulation is stimulated because a larger union reduces the benefits of lower public debt that
each individual government perceives to have on the public good of the credibility of the common
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monetary policy. From a normative perspective, the additional debt accumulation implied by
monetary unification is excessive only in the presence of fiscal imperfections in the form of
myopic governments. In the absence of fiscal imperfections, debt accumulation is too low if
monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias. Removing this inflation bias by delegating
monetary policy to a sufficiently conservative central bank establishes the second best.
Monetary unification thus produces additional excessive debt accumulation only in the
presence of both monetary distortions (originating in the inability to commit and resulting in
excessive inflation) and fiscal distortions (originating in myopic governments and resulting in
excessive debt accumulation). The monetary distortions cause monetary unification to boost debt
accumulation while the fiscal distortions imply that this additional debt accumulation is excessive.
In these circumstances, the second best can be achieved by supplementing a conservative,
independent central bank by debt ceilings. In this way, institutional arrangements are targetted
directly at the origins of the monetary and fiscal distortions.
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Technical appendices: NOT for publication.
A: Derivation of debt accumulation and welfare loss under a monetary union.
The CCB and the fiscal authorities play a Nash game in the first and second period. The central
bank chooses the inflation rate taking as given the fiscal authorities’ policy choices and taking as given the
expected inflation rate. The fiscal authority of country i selects theτi2 and gi2 in period 2, taking as given
π2, π2e and the other fiscal authorities’ policies, andτi1, gi1 and di1 in period 1, taking as givenπ1, π1e and
the other fiscal authorities’ policies.
A.1. Derivation of debt accumulation
The CCB’s second period problem is to minimize overπ2,
½ {απM π22 + ∑in=1 [(xi2-x̃2)2 + αgS (gi2-g̃2)2]/n}. (A.1)
























τ i2 x̃2/ν .
The second period Lagrangian of the fiscal authority of country i is,
£i2 = ½[απSπ22 + (ν(π2-π2e-τi2)-x̃2)2 + αgS(gi2-g̃2)2] + λi2[gi2+(1+ρ)di1-τi2-κπ2], (A.3)
where λi2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the second-period budget constraint of government i.
The first order conditions forτi2 and gi2 are given by, respectively,
-ν(ν(π2-π2e-τi2)-x̃2) = λi2, (A.4)
αgS(g̃2-gi2) = λi2. (A.5)
Impose rationality of expectations (π2e=π2) upon (A.4) and combine the resulting expression and (A.5) with
country i’s government financing requirement (2.6) for period 2, to yield
ν(ντi2+x̃2) = (1/ν2+1/αgS)-1[K̃2+(1+ρ)di1-κπ2], (A.6)
g̃2-gi2 = (1/αgS)(1/ν2+1/αgS)-1[K̃2+(1+ρ)di1-κπ2]. (A.7)
Impose rational expectations (π2e=π2) on (A.2) and substitute (A.6) (i=1,..,n) into the resulting expression.
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K̃2 (1 ρ)dj1 ,
where ND≡1/απM+1/ν2+1/αgS, as defined in the main text.
Government i’s second period equilibrium welfare loss is,
Li2
F ≡ ½[απSπ22 + (ντi2+x̃2)2 + αgS(gi2-g̃2)2], (A.9)
where π2, τi2 and gi2 are the equilibrium policy outcomes. Substitute (A.8) into (A.9). Furthermore,








































































In the first period, the central bank selectsπ1 to minimize,
½ {απM π12 + ∑in=1 [(xi1-x̃1)2 + αgS (gi1-g̃1)2]/n}. (A.11)
























τ i1 x̃1/ν .
The first-period Lagrangian of the fiscal authority of country i is,
£i1 = ½[απSπ12 + (ν(π1-π1e-τi1)-x̃1)2 + αgS(gi1-g̃1)2] + βFLi2F + λi1[gi1+(1+ρ)d0-τi1-κπ1-di1], (A.13)
whereλi1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the first period budget constraint of government i. The
first order conditions forτi1, gi1 and di1 are given by, respectively,
-ν(ν(π1-π1e-τi1)-x̃i1) = λi1, (A.14)
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αgS(g̃1-gi1) = λi1, (A.15)
βF∂Li2F/∂di1 = λi1. (A.16)
Impose rationality of expectationsπ1e=π1 upon (A.14) and combine the resulting expression with (A.15) and
country i’s government financing requirement (2.6) for period one, to yield
ν(ντi1+x̃1) = ND-1[K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-di1], (A.17)
Combine (A.14) (after having imposedπ1e=π1), (A.16) and (A.17) to yield,



























































































Because the necessary (and sufficient) conditions for an equilibrium are linear, there is a unique equilibrium
solution in general. Moreover, because the economies are all identical, in equilibrium all governments choose
















K̃2 (1 ρ)d1 (1 ρ) ,
where NDU
*=(1/n)(απS/απM2)+((n-1)/n)(κ/απM)+1/ν2+1/αgS, as defined in the main text. Substitute (A.20)
into (A.18) to yield,
ND
-1[K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-d1] = βF(1+ρ)(NDU*/ND2)[K̃2+(1+ρ)d1], (A.21)
which is (3.1) in the main text. (A.21) can be rewritten as,
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d1 = [βFU*(1+ρ)+1]-1 {[ K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-K̃2] + (1-βFU*)K̃2}, (A.22)
where βFU*=βF*(NDU*/ND) and whereβF*=βF(1+ρ), as defined in the main text. Substitute (A.22) for di1 into























β FU(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 β FUK̃2




















β FU(1 ρ) 1
F̃ ,
where F̃=(1+ρ)d0+K̃1+K̃2/(1+ρ), as defined in the main text. Similarly, substitute (A.22) for di1 into (A.6)























(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 K̃2




















β FU(1 ρ) 1
F̃ ,
The country index i has been suppressed because of the equivalence of the equilibrium policy choices across
countries.
A.2. Derivation of society’s equilibrium welfare loss
Using the, respectively, first- and second-period first-order conditions of the government’s























β FU(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 β FUK̃2












































(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 K̃2




















β FU(1 ρ) 1
F̃ .
Imposing rationality of expectations on the CCB’s reaction functions, using (A.23) and (A.24) and























β FU(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 β FUK̃2













































(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 K̃2




















β FU(1 ρ) 1
F̃ .
Substitute (2.1, t=1,2) into (2.2), impose rationality of expectations and the equivalence of fiscal
policies across countries, to obtain
VS,i = ½ ∑t2=1 βSt-1 [απS πt2 + (ντt+x̃t)2 + αgS (gt-g̃t)2], 0<βS≤1, απS,αgS>0. (A.29)
It is straightforward to obtain (4.1) through the substitution of (A.23)-(A.28) into (A.29).
B: Derivation of the second best equilibrium.
The second best equilibrium is the Pareto optimum in the absence of lump-sum taxes. This
equilibrium is attained if both the fiscal and monetary policy instruments for an individual country are
selected by a benevolent policymaker (i.e. the policymaker who shares the preferences of his own society)
who is able to commit. The solution is again found by working back in time and solving for the optimal
policies given the current value of the state variable (public debt) and given that future policies are optimally
selected.
We omit the country index because now the inflation rate is selected at the national level, while
each country’s policymaker faces the same optimization problem. Substitute (2.1) into (2.2) (for t=2) and
imposeπ2e=π2, so that the second-period Lagrangian of the policymaker can be written as,
£2 = ½[απSπ22 + (ντ2+x̃2)2 + αgS(g2-g̃2)2] + λ2[g2+(1+ρ)d1-τ2-κπ2], (B.1)
whereλ2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint in the second period.
The first order conditions (given the linear-quadratic specification of the problem, the first order conditions
are necessary and sufficient for the optimum) forπ2, τ2 and g2 are given by, respectively,
απSπ2 = λ2κ, (B.2)
ν(ντ2+x̃2) = λ2, (B.3)
αgS(g̃2-g2) = λ2, (B.4)
Eliminateλ2 from the system (B.2)-(B.4) to obtain:
π2 = (κ2ν2/απS)(τ2+x̃2/ν), (B.5)
g̃2-g2 = (ν2/αgS)(τ2+x̃2/ν), (B.6)
20
Combine (B.5) and (B.6) with the government financing requirement (2.6) for period 2, to obtain the second-




































K̃2 (1 ρ)d1 ,
where P≡κ2/απS+1/ν2+1/αgS. Substitution of (B.7)-(B.9) into the fiscal authority’s welfare loss function (and
imposingπ2e=π2), yields a second period welfare loss of ½P-1[K̃2+(1+ρ)d1]2.
If we substitute (2.1) into (2.2) (for t=1) and imposeπ1e=π1, the first-period Lagrangian of the
benevolent policymaker can be written as,
£1 = ½[απSπ12 + (ντ1+x̃1)2 + αgS(g1-g̃1)2] + ½βSP-1[K̃2+(1+ρ)d1]2 +
λ1[g1+(1+ρ)d0-τ1-κπ1-d1], (B.10)
whereλ1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint in the first period. The
first order conditions forπ1, τ1, g1 and d1 are given by, respectively,
απSπ1 = λ1κ, (B.11)
ν(ντ1+x̃1) = λ1, (B.12)
αgS(g̃1-g1) = λ1, (B.13)
βSP-1[K̃2+(1+ρ)d1](1+ρ) = λ1. (B.14)
Combine (B.11)-(B.13) with the government financing requirement (2.6) for period 1, to yield
ν(ντ1+x̃1) = P-1[K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-d1]. (B.15)
Combine (B.12), (B.14) and (B.15) to give
[K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-d1] = βS(1+ρ)[K̃2+(1+ρ)d1]. (B.16)
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Equation (B.16) can be rewritten as,
d1 = [βS*(1+ρ)+1]-1 {[ K̃1+(1+ρ)d0-K̃2]+(1-βS*)K̃2}, where βS*≡βS(1+ρ). (B.17)
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(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 K̃2
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β S(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 β SK̃2












































(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 K̃2












































β S(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 β SK̃2












































(1 ρ) K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 K̃2




















β S(1 ρ) 1
F̃ .
Combination of (2.1, t=1,2), the assumption of rational expectations, (2.2) and (B.18)-(B.23) yields the
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C: Proof that απME<απMopt<απS/κ if βF<βS.
(where απME>0 is defined as the value ofαπM which minimizes LA).






































(1 ρ)2 (β FU)2 β S
β FU(1 ρ) 1
2
> 0.
Let us first establish some properties of LA, the intratemporal welfare loss, and LE, the intertemporal
the welfare loss.













































Hence, LA is strictly decreasing (increasing) forαπM < (>) απS/κ so that it reaches its global minimum at
απM=απS/κ.
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which is negative ifαπM≤2απS/κ.
The proof consists of the following steps, in which we show that: (i) LE reaches its global minimum
at απM=απME, where 0<απME<απS/κ; (ii) L A is strictly decreasing forαπM≤απME and LE is strictly
decreasing forαπM<απME, hence there exists a value ofαπM>απME, such that society’s welfare loss is
lower than for any 0<απM≤απME; (iii) L E, when evaluated atαπM=απS/κ, is strictly increasing and is lower
than when evaluated at any otherαπM>απS/κ. Given that LA reaches a global minimum forαπM=απS/κ
(the minimum is interior, hence the slope of LA is flat at απM=απS/κ and, hence, there are no first-order
effects on LA of a change inαπM when evaluated atαπM=απS/κ), it then follows thatαπMopt<απS/κ.
Step (i): Remember that forαπM≤απS/κ, βFU* is strictly decreasing inαπM. At απM=απS/κ, βFU*=βF*<βS*.
Moreover,βFU* goes to infinity asαπM approaches zero from above. Hence, by continuity, there should be a
(unique) value ofαπM, denoted byαπME, between 0 andαπS/κ at which βFU*=βS*. LE reaches its global
minimum atβFU*=βS*, hence atαπM=απME.
Step (ii): Because απME<απS/κ, it follows immediately that LA is strictly decreasing forαπM≤απME.
Moreover, we have seen thatβFU* is strictly decreasing forαπM<απS/κ, hence, by the definition ofαπME,
βFU*>βS* for απM<απME. Hence, for απM<απME, ∂LE/∂βFU*>0 and ∂βFU*/∂απM<0, and, hence,
∂LE/∂απM<0.
Step (iii): Remember that at απM=απS/κ, βFU*=βF*<βS*, and, hence, ∂LE/∂βFU*<0 at απM=απS/κ.
Remember also thatβFU* is strictly decreasing atαπM=απS/κ. Therefore, ∂LE/∂απM>0 at απM=απS/κ.
Furthermore, NDU
*/ND=1 at απM=απS/κ, while NDU*/ND<1 for απM>απS/κ, as is easy to check. Hence, for
απM>απS/κ, βFU*<βF*<βS*. Because LE is strictly decreasing inβFU* for βFU*<βS*, LE when evaluated at
απM=απS/κ (hence atβFU*=βF*) must be lower than LE, when evaluated at someαπM>απS/κ.
D: Derivation of (5.2), societies’ welfare loss under a union-wide debt target̂d1.
To obtain society’s second-period welfare loss we can follow Appendix A.1. replacing dj1 (j=1,..,n)
24
with d̂1 (remember that Appendix A.1. derives the second-period welfare loss forgiven first-period debt
policies). Hence, an expression for the second-period welfare loss under a debt targetd̂1 is obtained by
replacing dj1 (j=1,..,n) with d̂1 in (A.10), which then reduces to
(D.1)LA K̃2 (1 ρ)d̂1
2
.
In the first period the CCB selectsπ1 to minimize (A.11), which yields the reaction function (A.12).
The first-period Lagrangian of the fiscal authority is now given by (the fiscal authority can no longer affect
its second-period financing requirement because it is constrained to set d1=d̂1),
£i1 = ½[απSπ12 + (ν(π1-π1e-τi1)-x̃1)2 + αgS(gi1-g̃1)2] + λi1[gi1+(1+ρ)d0-τi1-κπ1-d̂1], (D.2)
Combining the first-order conditions forτi1 and gi1 with the government financing requirement (2.6, t=1)
(where di1 is replaced byd̂1) and the CCB’s first-period reaction function, and using rationality of
expectations and the equivalence of the policies across countries in equilibrium, we obtain the following
policy outcomes for period one (where we drop again the country index, because of the equivalence of




































K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 d̂1 ,
Combining (D.3)-(D.5) and (2.2) (after having substituted (2.1, t=1) and imposedπ1e=π1) it is
straightforward to derive society’s first-period welfare loss:
(D.6)LA K̃1 (1 ρ)d0 d̂1
2
.
Society’s intertemporal welfare loss (5.2) is the sum of (D.1) (discounted to the first period against discount
factor βS) and (D.6).
